Research
Research
Abstract
In this paper, we explore the role of social influence for the coordination of effort choice in a game with strategic complementarities. Players are repeatedly randomly partitioned in groups to play a minimum effort game and choose their effort based on their beliefs about the minimal effort among the other members of their group. Individual expectations about this minimal effort is influenced by own experience as well as by communication of beliefs within a social network. We show that increasing the importance of social influence in the expectation formation process has positive effects on the emerging (long run) effort level, thereby improving the efficiency of the outcome. Furthermore, a more centralized social network leads to higher average efficiency, but also to increased variance of outcomes. Finally, communication of actual minimum effort cannot replace the communication of beliefs as a device fostering the emergence of high long run effort.
Paper available here.
Abstract
In this paper, we study a model of spill-over effects in a fixed network. Players choose effort levels and receive utility according to their own effort and the effort of the other players. There exists a global spill-over effect between all players and an additional local spill-over effect between neighbors. Moreover, neighbors suffer disutility when their efforts are different. We find the unique Nash equilibrium of the game and discuss policies to increase the total effort of all players. We find the positive keyplayer, i.e. the player that contributes most to the total effort. Additionally, we allow players to form unions where the members choose their efforts by maximizing the joint utility. We analyze how the union formation in the network affects the total effort in the population of players. We prove that unions always increase the total effort. Furthermore, we compare different partitions of players into unions and find the optimal partition. We study how the structure of these unions influences the total effort in the population.
Abstract
In this paper, we study a network game on a fixed multi-layer network. The players are embedded in a network of two types of relationships. One is a network of social interactions with pressure to conform to the social norm, the other provides additional strategic complementarities from players' interaction. Additionally, players are endowed with personal ideal efforts, a personal norm. They repeatedly choose their effort level in the network game and update the ideal effort based on the new effort choice. We study the dynamics of efforts and find the pure Nash equilibrium of the game in each period and provide conditions for the convergence of efforts and ideals to a steady state. Furthermore, we provide conditions for emerging long-run consensus about ideals in groups of players and the entire network.
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